Conclusion: Is a ‘Climate Emergency’ justified by the evidence?

Before we draw a conclusion on this question, it’s worth making a brief comment on the implications of the question we are addressing, to remind ourselves what’s at stake.

With a situation as dire as the evidence shows this is, society simply must not get this wrong. Facing such a time sensitive, existential risk but failing to respond adequately could commit humanity to widespread misery for hundreds and possibly thousands of years. It could literally change the course of evolution and human history.

This is the real-world context for the question of whether we need an emergency response to climate change.  And this context must always frame our response.

To summarise the discussion so far:

We first described what it means in practice to respond to a threat as an emergency. We considered actual historical responses to localised threats, like flooding or bushfire, through to more global emergencies such as WWII or the 2008 Financial Crisis.

What we identified from these comparisons is that shifting to an emergency mode of action is not business-as-usual undertaken with a stronger focus or intensity on a threat.

In an emergency, business as usual is suspended and an abnormal level of intensity is focused on managing the threat. This level of intensity is commensurate to the analysed threat and its likelihood and urgency.

We said that to make the decision to act in emergency mode, which is by definition and intent, disruptive to the status quo, requires two criteria to both be satisfied:

1.      That the risk or threat is clear, there is a reasonable likelihood of it occurring and it will have a large and unacceptable impact if it does; and

2.      That the response necessary to address and reduce the risk to an acceptable level requires an abnormal level of urgency, mobilization and action. In other words, a solution cannot be delivered through normal processes of policy and market economics.

We examined the expert advice on the first criteria and established that the threat is global and breath-taking in scale, with near certainty of widespread and severe impacts lasting for centuries, and a further, material level of risk of global collapse.

Short of full-scale nuclear war or a significant meteor strike, it is hard to imagine a greater threat to humanity than climate change.

We then examined the evidence on the second criteria - whether an abnormal level of urgency, mobilization and action was required, or if it could instead be addressed through the normal processes of policy and market economics, as we are currently doing. In other words, did we have time for the latter?

To answer this required us to determine both the scale of the action required, and the speed at which it would have to be delivered to address the risk.

The evidence produced by highly qualified people indicates that at a minimum (considering the history of underestimated impacts) we will most likely need to:

• Reduce CO2 emissions by significantly more than 45% in around 10 years; and

• Achieve net zero GHG emissions well before 2050; and

• Remove warming gases from the atmosphere urgently to curtail system feedbacks; and

• Prove and scale geo-engineering solutions within a decade or two, possibly less, to cool the planet to a safe level [FN12] [FN13].

Precision on whether the level of emissions reduction needs to be 45% or 100% by 2030, or whether the ultimate goal is to cap warming at 1.5 degrees C or much less, does not need to be resolved at this stage. That’s because any target in this range requires such dramatic deviation from ‘business as usual’, and such stronger intervention than any government is planning for [FN14], that it doesn’t change the answer to our question of whether a climate emergency mobilisation is justified.

We can clearly see, from the evidence of other emergency responses by society, what pursuing targets even at the bottom of that range would mean. 

It would require a high level of government intervention, backed by effective planning, policy and legislation, to drive action that is swift, ruthless and impactful. The state would need to openly communicate the magnitude of the threat and consequences of inaction; and then draw on all its own resources and the full capacity of its citizens and market participants to drive an effective response.

The economic mobilisation during WWII continues to be the best reference point for the scale and pace of economic and social intervention required. The big difference in the case of the climate emergency, however, is that most of the investment in fixing the problem will come from private not public money. It is the market that will ultimately make the investment and divestment decisions that allocate private capital to the task of transformation.

However, the market response today is nowhere near fast enough, nor at the scale required, to avoid a full-scale climate crisis. Therefore, if it is ‘left to the market’, the economy will likely collapse under the weight of climate driven instability.

Therefore, the state needs to send crystal clear and unambiguous signals to the market to act with both urgency and intensity. These signals need to include both a strong carbon price and clear objectives regarding the speed and scale of change required.

In summary therefore, the evidence clearly establishes:

• The scale and level of risk - it threatens civilisation;

• The scale of change required - the transformation of the economy;

• The speed with which it must be delivered – largely within a decade.

Based on the evidence - even using a cautious and conservative analysis - it is clear that only shifting to an emergency mode of action could successfully address the existential risk that the climate crisis presents to humanity.

The economic argument for a climate emergency mobilisation is also powerful - as well as avoiding severe economic risks the evidence demonstrates the economic and social benefits could be considerable.

What this means is we have been warned of an imminent and immediate danger. Not just a danger to our prosperity or our level of progress but a danger to the very existence of organised civilisation. We know how to fix this and we can afford to do so.

We have been told. Now we have to choose…

Footnotes

[FN12] It must be emphasized that none of these technologies are currently viable at scale in terms of technical effectiveness, cost, risk and governance.  They also need to be addressed for their net social and environmental benefit.

[FN13] For additional reading on cooling and drawdown see: Randers, J & Gilding, P (2010). The one degree war plan. Journal of Global Responsibility, Vol. 1 No. 1 pp 170. https://paulgilding.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/one-degree-war-plan-emerald-version.pdf and Silk, E (2016) The Climate Mobilization Victory Plan. Published by The Climate Mobilization August 2016, revised March 2019. https://www.theclimatemobilization.org/victory-plan

[FN14] Assuming the successful implementation of planned NDC pledges made by governments under the Paris Agreement, the IPCC predicts that emissions will reach 52–58 GtCO2e yr−1 in 2030 (around double the 25-30 GtCO2e yr−1 required limit warming to 1.5°C) (IPCC 2018. SR15, Ch2, pp 95-96). With these emissions, warming will surpass 1.5°C and likely reach 3°C by 2100 with additional warming beyond (IPCC 2018. SR15, Ch1, pp 56).