Is a climate emergency mobilisation ‘realistic’? Is this change possible? 

The global debate on climate change, even amongst those deeply engaged, is stuck in a kind of cognitive dissonance [FN2]. On the one hand, outside the irrational world of climate denialism, very few who examine the issue then argue against the core conclusions of science and other experts - that securing the safety and stability of society requires us to move with war like speed to transform the economy.  

On the other hand, many of the same people then argue ‘oh yes, but it’s not realistic’ to expect we would actually do this. This is the dominant view of many oil companies like Shell and BP for example – that we should act, but we are not likely to, so we should carry on investing and behaving as we are.

Without articulating it, this means such people and companies assume collapse and descent into chaos is the most ‘realistic’ outcome. This is of course quite irrational.  Not to mention self-fulfilling.

Having an emergency response to climate change is a choice we get to make, not a predetermined direction or outcome. The likelihood of success is absolutely arguable and quite unknowable – as it was in WWII - but the decision to do the most we possibly can to achieve it is completely ours.  

We are fully in control.

As society moves into a more detailed debate on the Climate Emergency concept, it will therefore be very useful to address the processes and examples from history of how such radical shifts can - and have - occurred. We can refer to examples of social movements and other relatively sudden shifts in public attitudes and policy to establish that not only is an emergency mobilisation necessary, but in fact completely realistic. 

WWII is a commonly used example and a very good one, but there are many others where issues have festered for a long time then apparently suddenly shifted. The “Me Too” movement in the US is a current example, and other recent ones include moves against smoking in public places, marriage equality and so forth.  Of course climate change is much bigger, which is why WWII continues to be the best example, but we can also consider other globally coordinated responses. 

A good example is the 2008 global financial crisis where we suddenly committed to spending trillions of dollars to prevent a depression. Importantly in that case, as it will be on climate change, it wasn’t a formal global decision-making body or treaty that created the change but a far more informal flurry of meetings, diplomacy and rapidly built alignment of intent.

There’s little question we’re both capable of choosing to act and then acting. The question is not that. It is, will we decide to?

We therefore need to consider how that might actually happen in terms of social change. With an issue as broad and significant as climate change, when there are so many actors and sectors involved, we need to see the likely tipping point through the lens of the modern world as a complex system. This system will almost certainly shift in a distributed way, rather than through a single event or lone act of leadership. 

This is why we need to understand that social movements, public attitudes and NGOs like the Extinction Rebellion are a crucial part of the process of triggering change. We have seen in recent times with both Extinction Rebellion and the emergence of the School Strike Movement just how fast and unexpectedly public attitude change can occur.

An equally crucial part of system change though, will be the behaviour of many other players. These include the military and security forces, new disruptive and innovative companies, trade unions, the existing business community, wealthy philanthropists, investors, academia and scientists. As the momentum and pressure for change builds, society’s elites – leaders in all these areas – will play a crucial role. However, such a process of system and social change will only get us to the tipping point where action is demanded.

While we live in a distributed world, a distributed system cannot declare or implement a climate emergency mobilisation. 

Despite the focus on neo-liberalism in recent decades, it is still only the state, because of its legal authority, that can deliver a climate emergency mobilisation. 

Therefore, the state will in the end, be the single most critical actor. 

Footnotes

[FN2] Defined as: “The state of having inconsistent thoughts, beliefs, or attitudes, especially as relating to behavioural decisions and attitude change.”